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[Abstract] 
 
 Political conflicts among trading partners have changed their forms with ever-increasing 
flows of foreign direct investment.  A decrease in the exports of Japan might merely be a 
reflection of a global production shift by Japanese multinational corporations.  We 
investigate the effect of Japanese trade on the exports of other countries to the United States 
in the 1990s.  In our sample we include eight Asian countries besides the US and Japan.  
With the trade data disaggregated at the HS 4-digit level, we regress the exports of an Asian 
country to the US on the Japanese exports to the US and the third-country, and the Japanese 
FDI to a third-country in a panel data specification.  Among eight countries investigated, we 
find the evidence that Chinese and Japanese exports are substitutes in the US market while 
the exports of China to the US are partly promoted by Japanese FDI to China. The estimation 
result confirms a view that China competes vigorously with Japan in the US market while 
Japanese multinationals are adjusting their production bases to China in a process of 
reforming a new global production network. 
 
 
 
Key Words: China, Foreign Direct Investment, Japan, Trade, Triangular Trade Approach. 
JEL Classification: F14, F23 
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1. Introduction 
 In the last two decades, international trade with China has expanded most 
rapidly while the Chinese economy has experienced an unprecedented high growth.  
Between 1992 and 2000, Chinese exports have almost tripled from $84.9 billion to $249 
billion.  During the same period, Chinese imports have also grown from $80.6 billion 
to $225 billion.  With the accession to the WTO in 2001, China’s trade is expected to 
experience an even higher growth in the years to come. 
 China’s significant presence in the world trade, however, has also given a rise 
to new trade disputes with trading partners.  China is not only condemned for its 
sluggish response to foreign partners’ requests to open up its domestic markets, but also 
for its pervasive violations in intellectual property rights such as computer software 
licenses.  A recent active debate between Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve Board, and the US Congress about the restrictions on textile imports from 
China also exemplifies political concerns over a loss of manufacturing jobs in US 
industries competing directly with Chinese manufacturers. 1   A list of other 
manufacturing products under debates between these two countries includes bedroom 
furniture, television sets, handbags, and handcarts. 
 To many, these trade issues between the US and China are reminiscent of the 
trade conflicts between the US and Japan that lasted for decades until recently.  While 
both academic and business circles intensely debated on foreign access to Japanese 
domestic markets, Japanese exporters in textile, automobile, and semiconductors among 
many others received fierce allegations of unfair trade practices that were claimed to 
have hurt US industries.2 The intensity of the bilateral trade disputes waned in the last 
decade, partly due to the decade-long recession in Japan, and more importantly, to the 
emergence of China as the world exporter3. 
 Generally speaking, political conflicts between trading countries could change 
their forms and players as the tide in foreign direct investment changes its direction.  
For example, a decrease in the exports of a country might merely be a reflection of 
global production shift by the country’s multinational corporations.  Although we 
                                                  
1 See New York Times’ articles, “US moves to limit textile imports from China,” Nov 19, 2003, and 
“Greenspan warns Congress not to create trade barriers,” Mar 12, 2004. 
2 For example, papers in Krugman (1991) discuss the degree of openness of Japanese domestic markets.  
Lawrence (1991) argues “keiretsu” is one of the sources of trade barriers in Japan, whereas Saxonhouse 
(1993) takes a view that Japan is no different from other industrial countries in terms of market access for 
foreign competitors. 
3 For example, between 1999 and 2003, there is only one trade dispute case against Japan brought to the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism. 
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witness the “threat” of Japanese exports waning and US-Japan trade conflicts 
diminishing, that change may be because of strategic moves by Japanese multinational 
corporations to shift their production bases from Japan to other countries.  In other 
words, some part of the surge in the exports from China to the US may have been the 
Japanese products by the same Japanese companies or their affiliates in China with the 
labels changed from ‘made in Japan’ to ‘made in China.’  The Ministry of Finance 
reported that the number of new outflow FDI cases by Japanese firms to China 
exceeded those to the US in 1994, 1995 and 2002.  
 For China, unquestionably, the US and Japan are the most important trading 
partners besides Hong Kong.  Trading with these major economic powers is increasing 
its importance for China especially for the recent years.  Before China started 
decentralizing its economy, Hong Kong played the most important role as a middleman 
between China and the rest of the world; Table 1 shows that in 1992, Hong Kong was 
China’s biggest trading partner in both exports and imports in terms of traded values.4  
For the recent years, with its economic liberalization efforts, China started trading more 
directly with the rest of the world while Hong Kong’s role as a middleman dwindled.  
Nonetheless, if we assume the indirect trade flows via Hong Kong to China are 
proportional to the direct trade flows to China, we could say the US and Japan have 
been the two largest trading partners in both exports and imports during the last decade.  
Between 1992 and 2000, China’s imports from Japan tripled from $13.7 billion to $41.5 
billion while imports from the US more than doubled from $8.9 billion to $22.4 billion 
(see Table 1).  During the same period, while China’s exports to Japan dramatically 
increased by almost four-folds from $11.7 billion to $41.6 billion , its exports to the US 
even surpassed the growth of exports to Japan from $8.6 billion to $52.1 billion. 
 In this study we investigate the dynamics of the trilateral trade relationship 
among China, Japan and the US.  More specifically in what we call ‘triangular trade 
approach,’ we explore how Japanese trade and foreign direct investment affect the 
exports of China to the US market.  Moreover, we also investigate the same trilateral 
trade relationship for other seven Asian countries among an Asian country, Japan and 
the US5 .  With comparison to other Asian countries, we can check a possible 
peculiarity of Chinese trade for robustness.  For the reminder of the paper, we refer a 
country other than the US and Japan as a “third-country” for convenience. 
 With the trade data disaggregated at the HS 4-digit level, we regress the exports 
                                                  
4 See Fung and Iizaka (1998) for a detailed description on Hong Kong’s role as a re-exporter of US and 
Japanese exports to China. 
5 These countries are Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippine, Singapore, and Thailand.  
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of a third-country to the US on the Japanese exports to the US as well as those to the 
third-country in a panel data specification while controlling for Japanese FDI and other 
macro economic variables.  With this triangular trade approach, it can be examined 
whether Japanese exports to the U.S. are in a substitute relationship with those of a 
third-country, while this relationship possibly signifying Japanese multinationals’ shift 
of their production bases in the Asian countries. 
 One contribution of our paper in empirical international trade literature is that 
we attempt to estimate bilateral trade in a three-country framework whereas most of the 
previous empirical works on international trade considers bilateral trade in a 
two-country framework.  The empirical studies on bilateral trades using gravity models 
ignore a possibly important source of trade determinants, that is, presence of a third 
country. 
 Our main empirical results are as follows.  First, we find that Japanese exports 
to China promote Chinese exports to the US.  However, after controlling for Japan’s 
FDI to China, the trade enhancing effect of Japanese exports to China disappears, which 
indicates that Japanese exports to China promote Chinese exports to US only because 
Japanese firms have shifted their production bases to China.  Moreover, we also find 
that Japanese FDI to other countries are not promoting exports of those countries to US.  
Second, after controlling for the US market size for each commodity, we confirm that 
the exports of many countries are in competitive relationship with Japanese exports.  
However, the absolute magnitude of the coefficients remained much higher for China.  
Third, our results indicate that the use of macroeconomic variables do not help 
explaining fluctuations of disaggregated trade, probably due to the lack of finer 
variation compared to disaggregated trade variables.   
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section2 reviews previous 
empirical research investigating the link among the Asian countries and Japan.  Section 
3 reviews the related literature and presents theoretical backgrounds for our triangular 
trade approach.  In section 4, we describe our data set.  Section 5 discusses our 
preliminary estimation results for triangular trade framework.  The preliminary 
investigation with macroeconomic variables suggests that we need to use more 
disaggregated data comparable to trade data.  Section 6 discusses the estimation results 
with foreign direct investment at the industry level and US total imports at the 
commodity level.  Section 7 presents conclusions. 
 
2. The economic linkage among the Asian economies: the trade-FDI nexus 
 Since they started discussing the recipe of the “Asian miracle” in the early 
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1990s, many researchers have focused on the strength of the interdependencies of trade 
and investment, often dubbed as the trade-FDI nexus, in the Asian-Pacific region.  The 
relationship between trade and FDI in the region is often claimed to have entailed 
two-way causality.  The Asian economies implementing policies to create friendly 
environment for an inward investment were able to transform their industrial structures 
toward a more export-oriented economy.  Then, export expansion has positive 
feedback effects that facilitate further liberalization of goods and financial trade.  
Finally, financial liberalization will enable countries to receive more FDI inflows.  
Petri (1995) finds empirical evidence in both the macro and the firm level that supports 
the relationship between trade and FDI is two-way causality.   
 Between 1985 and 1997, exports from East Asia marked a steady almost 
five-fold increase (before declining in 1998 due to the Asian financial crisis), raising the 
share of exports in world total export from 9 percent in 1980-85 to 18 percent 1997 (see 
Kawai, 2004).  Simultaneously, FDI inflows are expanding in East Asia hand-in-hand 
with trade.  The share of FDI inflows to East Asia in world total increased from eight 
percent in 1985 to 22 percent in the mid-1990s, thought it declined again to nine percent 
in 2002.  
 While enlarging its exporting capacity, foreign direct investments in the Asian 
region also changed the trade structure of the region.  As Fukao, et al. (2003) 
documents, we have observed a sharp rise in intra-industry trade following vertical FDIs 
by multinational corporations of the US and Japan.   These multinationals relocated 
segments of production rather than entire industries, depending on each country’s 
comparative advantage (Hill and Athukorala, 1998).  Hence, the trade expansion in 
East Asia inevitably involved a rise in intra-industry trade. Athukorala (2003) 
documents that expansion in fragmented trade is the most evident in the East Asian 
region, more than in Europe or North America. 
 For the Asian economies, the US and Japan are the most important trading 
partners. Table 2 presents the shares of Japan and the US in the trade of the Asian 
countries for the period between 1990 and 2000.  We can see that US markets are 
important for Asian exports while Japan is also important source country of imports to 
these countries.  The share of the US as the export destination ranges from 14 percent 
(Indonesia) to 30 percent (the Philippines), while that of Japan as the import source 
country from 16percent (Indonesia) to 25percent (Thailand).  With these observations, 
we can depict a stereotype that Japan exports to Asia while the latter exports to the US. 
 Japan’s role as an FDI provider in the region is also increasing its importance. 
Table 3 reports both the value and the number of Japanese FDI cases in East Asia for the 
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period between 1989 and 2002.  We can see that Japanese FDI toward China is 
increasing enormously.  The total value of direct investment flows to China, starting 
from a level slightly above the Philippines in 1989, hits its peak in 1995, exceeding far 
beyond twofold of those of other Asian countries.  The figures in terms of FDI cases 
are even more striking; 27 percent of Japanese total FDI is directed to China in 1995.  
China is the major recipient of Japanese FDI in the Asian region during the last decade. 
 Given these trends in trade and FDI in the Asian region, many researchers have 
investigated the characteristics of the trade-FDI nexus in the region.  Petri (1992) finds 
Japanese firms’ FDI to Thailand enhances both trade between the two countries and 
trade between these two countries and the rest of the world, while Lee (1994) and Lin 
(1996) present evidence that the FDI from the home countries, Korea and Taiwan, 
respectively, promote only the bilateral trade volumes.  Between Japan’s exports and 
FDI to East Asia, Kawai and Urata (1998) also find a complementary relationship for 
food, textiles, chemical products, general machinery, and electric machinery.  However, 
they also find that exports and FDI in wood and pulp exhibit a strong negative 
relationship.  Dobson and Chia (1997), investigating intra-firm trade in East Asia, 
conclude that intra-firm trade tends to diminish as the host country’s economy matures, 
because the direction of FDI shifts to more sophisticated, or more end-user type of 
products such as consumer durables as the host country develops and its domestic 
purchasing power rises. 
 One important note we must make here is that most of the empirical studies on 
the trade-FDI nexus are focusing on the bilateral trade and bilateral FDI flows and also 
tend to base their empirical models on the bilateral gravity model.  Our paper makes 
one important contribution to the literature, that is, we look at the dynamics of the 
trade-FDI nexus among the US, Japan, and an Asian third country in a three country 
frame work. 
 
3. Triangular Trade Approach and Related Literature 
3-1. FDI and Trade in a Two-Country Framework: Mode of Entry 
 When considering to supply products in a foreign market, a multinational firm 
can choose whether it exports its products directly from its home country, or produces in 
the foreign market through its foreign subsidiaries.  In the trade empirical literature, 
many researchers have attempted to answer the question of whether foreign production 
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(i.e., FDI) and exports are substitutes or complements.6  Yamawaki (1991), Clausing 
(2000), and Head and Ries (2001) find empirical evidence that supports a 
complimentary relationship between foreign production and exports.  Belderbos and 
Sleuwaegen (1998) find that Japanese FDI and exports are substitutes only when the 
intention of FDI is to avoid antidumping tariffs in Europe.  Blonigen (2001), using 
product-level data, also finds evidence for a substitute relationship between FDI and 
exports when FDI is horizontal.  However, these studies only focus on outward FDI 
flows and exports, both of which move in the same direction from a home country.   
 Our framework is more in line with Zhang and Felmingham (2001) who 
investigate the causal relationship between inward FDI to China and exports from China.  
Using data from both national and provincial levels, they confirm that the causal 
relationship is bidirectional.  Especially for the causality from inward FDI flows to 
exports, they argue that foreign investors who have superior knowledge on the world 
market conditions tend to be successful in exporting products from the host country. 
  
3-2. FDI and Trade in a Three-Country Framework: Intra-firm Trade 
 In this paper we extend the investigation on the FDI-trade relationship to a 
three-country framework.  Given the recent trends in international trade which involve 
multilateral intra-firm trade associated with an expansion of FDI at global scale, we 
think that investigating the dynamics of trade in the conventional bilateral framework is 
not sufficient.  In order to examine the dynamics of trade between, say, China and the 
US, we cannot ignore the effect of other trade flows between China and other countries 
than the US, as well as FDI flows from other countries into China.  In what follows, 
we attempt to disentangle and generalize the complex trilateral trade and FDI 
relationship in the simplest manner. 
 
A. Vertical Foreign Direct Investment 
Let us consider the trade-FDI dynamics of one commodity among three 
countries: the US, Japan, and a third country which we call China for now.  For the 
sake of brevity, we assume that the US provides a market for the commodity, and Japan 
has a multinational firm that produces the commodity.  The multinational firm may 
involve two firms for the production of the commodity: an upstream firm, U, and a 
downstream firm, D, while the former supplies intermediate goods to the latter which 
                                                  
6 More recent development in the literature can be also found in Helpman, et al. (2004) who use the ratio 
of export sales and foreign sales and find that the heterogeneity of firms in the industry is also an 
important determinant for the choice between exporting and FDI-based foreign production. 
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also sells the final product to the US market.  If both downstream and upstream firms 
are established in Japan, the products will be exported directly from Japan to the US.  
The trade dynamics of this first base case are shown in Figure 1.a.  Arrows in the 
figure represent flows of goods.  In this case international trade flows are purely 
bilateral between the US and Japan, and involve no foreign production or FDI by the 
Japanese multinational. 
 Now, we consider a next case where the Japanese multinational makes vertical 
FDI7.  The Japanese multinational firm fragments its production by establishing a 
downstream firm, D’, in China through vertical FDI, and export products from there.  
This case is depicted in Figure 1.b.  We assume for simplicity that the domestic 
downstream plant, D, is shut down, and that all of the exports come from the 
Japanese-affiliated plant, D’, in China.  This case leads to three changes in the trade 
flows among the three countries.  First, Japanese exports to the US stop because of the 
shut-down of the domestic plant D. Second, Japanese exports to China, instead, brings 
about intra-firm trade between the parent firm U and its foreign affiliate D’.  Also, 
Chinese exports to the US emerge because the Japanese downstream plant in China 
starts shipping products. 
 In reality, a trilateral relationship is not as clear-cut as is shown above.  
However, we can come up with a general prediction that if Japanese firms are shifting 
their production to China through vertical FDI to China, Japanese exports to the US 
would decrease while both Japanese exports to China and Chinese exports to the US 
would increase. With vertical foreign direct investment, even if Japanese exports of a 
certain product are observed to be decreasing on the surface, Japanese exporters are still 
exporting to the US, but by bypassing through China. 
 
                                                  
7 We can also consider the case with a multinational firm shifting its upstream firm to a local market, 
however, this case does not alter the existing trade flow. 
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B. Horizontal Foreign Direct Investment 
 Next, we turn to a case where the Japanese multinational makes horizontal 
FDI.8  Figure 2.a depicts another base case in which the Japanese multinational exports 
its products directly to the US.  However, unlike the case in Figure 1.a, we assume the 
multinational does not possess a vertical chain of production.  In other words, the 
firm’s production is vertically internalized.  Since there is no distinction between 
upstream and downstream firms, we just denote the multinational firm as M.  Figure 
2.b shows the case where horizontal FDI occurs, making the product exported from 
China instead of Japan.  In practice, as in Figure 1.b, the trade flows based on 
horizontal FDI would entail a decrease in Japanese direct exports to the US and an 
increase in Chinese exports to the US.  However, contrary to the previous vertical FDI 
case, the shift in the trade flows in this case does not yield any intra-firm trade between 
Japan and China. 
 
C. Spillover effect 
 So far we have only argued for a possible trade structure change caused by 
foreign direct investment by multinational firms.  However, the presence of foreign 
affiliate firms might also create spillover effects on local exporters.  A large amount of 
literature investigate whether inward direct investment may enhance the productivity of 
domestic firms in the host country.  For example, Javorcik (2004) finds evidence for 
positive spillover effects of foreign affiliates to their local suppliers.  Therefore, 
spillovers from Japanese affiliates to local firms can enhance the productivity of the 
                                                  
8 For the analysis on the determinants of vertical and horizontal trade, refer to Aizenman and Marion 
(2001). 
US 
China Japan 
D’ 
U 
US 
China Japan 
D 
U 
Figure 1.a : prior to FDI  
Figure 1.b: after vertical FDI 
for down stream firm  
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latter and eventually making local producers to be more competitive exporters in 
international market.  With this spillover effect we expect to observe an increase in 
export of host country with an inflow of FDI. 
 
      
3-3. Do Imports Promote Export? 
 Besides FDI flows, other factors can affect the trilateral trade relationship.  
Some studies find that imports of foreign products with higher quality force domestic 
competitors to become more efficient through international competition.  MacDonald 
(1994) finds that the growth of import ratio raised productivity growth in US industries.  
In a more generalized sense, we can also ask whether competitive pressure increases the 
productivity of firms or the industry.  Galdon-Sanchez and Schmitz (2002) find that 
competitive pressure in iron-ore markets led to an increase in US labor productivity. 
 There are, on the other hand, an overwhelming amount of findings that more 
efficient firms tend to export.  Bernard and Jensen (1999) find that both the growth 
rates and the levels of success measures are higher for exporters in ex-ante.  
Combining these two premises and applying to our trilateral trade analysis, we can 
hypothesize that an increase in imports from a Japanese firm (JPN) to China may lead a 
Chinese domestic firm (CHN) to become more efficient and start exporting.  This case 
is shown in Figure 3.  Although the trade flows look alike to the case in Figure 1.b, 
unlike the previous case, this case does not involve any FDI flows. 
US 
China Japan 
M 
Figure 2.a: prior to FDI  
US 
China Japan 
M 
Figure 2.b: after horizontal FDI  
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3-4. Competition or Compliments 
 Lastly, but not the least, we can think of a case where Japanese exports to the 
US and Chinese exports to the US are substitute for those products in direct competition, 
see Figure 4.  This is highly plausible for an industry in which exports of two countries 
are similar in quality.  In this case, the head-to-head competition between Japanese and 
Chinese firms should appear as a negative correlation between Japanese and Chinese 
exports to the US. 
 On the other hand, Japanese and Chinese firms could have a complementary 
relationship if both export intermediate products but different components to the US 
market where a firm in the US assembles final goods using these intermediate products.  
When we are dealing with data, we might observe positive correlation between Japanese 
and Chinese exports to the US.  It is, however, unlikely to find products from two 
countries to be complement if we keep industry classification to be as disaggregate as 
HS 4-digit level.  In empirical sections we use HS 4-digit level classification for trade 
data, therefore, we expect to find negative correlation between Japanese exports and 
Chinese exports to the US, given competition effect overwhelming compliment effect. 
 
3-5. A Triangular Trade Approach 
US 
China Japan 
CHN JPN 
US 
China Japan 
CHN JPN 
Figure 3: positive spillover effect from 
imports 
Figure 4: negative relation from 
competition  
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 The above discussions have shown the complexity of the trade-FDI dynamics, 
however, it is also demonstrated that we only need to examine the relationship between 
three different flows of trade among the three countries.  Figure 5 presents a generic 
export flow chart among the three countries.  The Japanese exports to the US and those 
to China are denoted as JPNUS and JPNCHN, respectively, and the Chinese exports to 
the US is denoted as CHNUS.9   
 Table 4 summarizes all the scenarios we discussed and expected signs for the 
correlations between two of the three trade flows.  Between JPNUS and CHNUS we 
would expect negative relation if products are in direct competition in the US market or 
FDI is horizontal or vertical.  Between JPNCHN and CHNUS the expected relation is 
positive if there is spillover effect from Japanese export to Chinese firms or FDI is 
vertical.  For a blank space, it indicates that there is no specific theoretical prediction 
for the sign of the correlation.   
 Classifying possible scenarios and expected signs for the correlations between 
two of the trade flows in the triangular trade relationship is helpful in the empirical 
analysis.  The export flow from China or a third country to the US can be used as the 
dependent variable in a model in which we can include JPNCHN and JPNUS as 
explanatory variables.  This is what we call the “triangular trade approach.”  Finally, 
we should note that relation between two trades captures two closely linked but distinct 
sources, i.e., trade and foreign direct investment.  In the empirical analysis, we also 
include FDI variables to disentangle these effects in the triangular trade approach 
framework.   
 
                                                  
9 For the sake of brevity, we continue to use China as the third country.  However, in the empirical 
analysis section, we will test other East Asian countries as the third country. 
US 
China Japan 
CHNUS JPNUS 
JPNCHN 
Figure 5: Triangular Trade 
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Table 4: Expected Signs for the Correlation between Trade Flows 
 
   JPNCHN and CHNUS  JPNUS and CHNUS 
Vertical FDI   +    - 
Horizontal FDI       - 
Imports-Exports   +  
Competition       - 
 
 
4. The Data  
 The export data used in this study are extracted at the HS 4-digit level from 
International Trade by Commodity Statistics, Harmonized System Rev.1, OECD.  At 
this level of disaggregation, there are 1,367 commodity classifications.  From this set 
of data, we select our sample in two steps.  First, we omit the commodities which are 
either not traded between a pair of countries or missing in any of the years in our sample 
period of 1990 through 2000.  We also restrict our sample to comprise the commodities 
for which a complete set of observations exists with a strictly positive amount of trade 
for the entire sample period.  Second, we need three flows of exports for each “third 
country”: Japanese exports to the third-country, Japanese exports to the US, and the 
third-country’s exports to the US.  Then, we restrict our data to only those 
commodities with a complete set of observations for all three kinds of exports.  This 
selection process reduces the observations considerably, and also causes the number of 
observations (even for the same HS 4-digit classification codes) to vary among the third 
countries depending upon data availability.  For example, there are 576 commodities 
for China while there are only 162 commodities for Indonesia10. 
 Annual observations of exchange rate volatility are constructed from monthly 
exchange rates which are obtained from IMF’s International Financial Statistics.  
Other macroeconomic variables, such as inflation rates, real GDP per capita, nominal 
GDP, and aggregate trade flows, are retrieved from IFS and Direction of Trade, IMF.  
We also include the trade intensity indices for each pair of trading countries using the 
method in Frankel and Rose (1997) and the data from DOT and IFS.  More details on 
the data definitions are given in Appendix 1. 
                                                  
10 The number of commodities for third countries are 576 for China, 572 for Korea, 487 for Hong Kong, 
288 for Singapore, 310 for Thailand, 162 for Indonesia, 180 for the Philippines, and 218 for Malaysia. 
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5. Preliminary Empirical Results 
 In this section we investigate bilateral trade in the three country framework.  
Specifically, we analyze the effect of Japanese exports on the exports of a third country 
to the US.  Slightly modified from Figure 5, from now on, we denote exports of a 
third-country to the US as THDUS, Japanese exports to a third-country as JPNTHD and 
Japanese exports to the US as JPNUS. 
 
5-1. A General Estimation Model and Specification Test 
 First, we specify a general error component regression model for the panel 
dataset using the first-differenced trade flows among the three countries as shown in 
equation (1).  We assume that the coefficients for the export variables are 
heterogeneous among the sample countries. 
 
 , , , , , , , , , ,1 1 1
                                                1,..., ;   ( ) 1,..., ( );   1,...,
I I K
THDUS i JPNTHD i JPNUS k
i j t i i j t i i j t k i t i j i j t
i i k
T D T D T Z
i I j i J i t T
α β φ λ ε
= = =
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + + +
= = =
∑ ∑ ∑ .    (1) 
 
, ,
THDUS
i j tT∆  is the first-differenced exports of a third-country to the US, while , ,JPNTHDi j tT∆  
and , ,
JPNUS
i j tT∆  are the first-differenced Japanese exports to the third-country and to the 
US, respectively, for country i and commodity j at year t.  The dummy variable iD  
takes a value of unity for country i and zero otherwise, and is included to allow for 
heterogeneous coefficients for the export variables.  ,
k
i tZ  represents a k-th exogenous 
variable for country i at year t.  ,i jλ  is the error component term for commodity j for 
country i while , ,i j tε  is the disturbance term.  We should note that the number of 
commodities, J(i), varies for each country i and that we suppress (i) for the subscript j in 
the notation. 
 For the specification test on the random effects, many researcher use Hausman 
(1978) which employs both GLS and Within estimators.  Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
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show that alternative test statistics incorporating the Between estimators are also 
numerically identical.  However, these tests are no longer valid if the disturbances are 
heteroskedastic and/or serially correlated.  Arellano (1993) suggests an alternative 
Wald test which is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of the disturbances.  
In this study, we use this robust test statistic to select our model specification and 
choose between random effect and fixed effect models.11  If the null hypothesis that the 
conditional expectation of the unobserved individual effects is zero is rejected, we will 
adopt the fixed effect model in the following analysis.  If the LM heteroskedasticity 
test or Bhargava-DW statistics from Within estimation indicate that the disturbances 
possess heteroskedasticity or serial autocorrelation, we use the White 
heterosckedasticity-consistent standard deviations.  If the null can not be rejected, we 
will adopt the random effect model specification. 
 
5-2. Preliminary Results with only Export Variables 
 First, as a preliminary analysis, we start with a panel data estimation, using 
only the export variables as shown in equation (2).  When we calculate the 
aforementioned robust Arellano statistic, it is found to be 75.2, with which we can reject 
the null hypothesis at the one percent significance level.  Therefore, we use the fixed 
effect specification for the regression model.  Since test statistics also indicate that the 
model specification entails heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the disturbances, 
we use the White standard deviations. 
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 Table 5 reports the estimation results.  The estimated coefficients for JPNTHD, 
Japanese exports to a third-country, are found to be always positive.  We obtained 
statistically significant coefficients for China, Korea and Malaysia.  Notably, the 
magnitude of the coefficients is often higher for some countries than others.  
Especially for Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia, the estimated coefficients for JPNTHD 
are 0.30, 0.32, and 0.73, respectively, more than tenfold of the coefficients for Hong 
                                                  
11 For the summary of Hausman’s specification test, see Baltagi (2001).  Also, see Ahn and Low (1996) 
and Baltagi et al. (2003) for recent developments of the specification tests. 
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Kong, Thailand, and Indonesia. 
 From this preliminary analysis, we can interpret that export promotion effect of 
Japanese exports in the Asian economies is pervasive although we find only weak 
evidence for some countries.  In section 3 we discussed a possibility for the import 
channel of technology transfer from exporting country, in this case Japan, to importing 
countries.  This result is not surprising for Korea when we look at new global 
corporations emerging from Korea are in many cases under same industry of Japanese 
multinationals, e.g., Samsung vs. Sony and Hyundai vs. Toyota.  At this stage, 
however, we can not exclude a possibility of FDI effect as also discussed in section 3.       
 The expected sign for the coefficient of JPNUS (Japanese exports to the US) 
can be negative when the exports from Japan and those from a third-country are 
competing head-to-head.  The coefficient can also be negative if a large portion of the 
change in a third-country’s exports to the US involves products of Japanese affiliated 
firms in the third country. That is, if Japanese companies are shifting their production 
bases from Japan to their subsidiaries in the third-country, that will cause Japanese 
exports to reduce and the third country’s exports to the US to increase.  It can be 
positive, however, when there are common factors, such as high US economic growth, 
causing the world exports to increase.  
 Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of JPNUS is significantly negative only 
for China (–0.05).  We can interpret this result as evidence for two alternative 
hypotheses that Japanese multinational corporations are shifting their production bases 
to China, and that direct exports from companies in Japan to the US markets are being 
replaced by the exports from China.  We can not, however, distinguish these two 
hypotheses at this stage.  Although the other coefficients are insignificant, the 
coefficient for Korea is significantly positive (0.22) at the one percent significant level.  
The coefficient means that a ten million dollar increase in the Japanese exports to the 
US leads to a two million dollar increase in Korean exports to US markets. 
 Given a wide variety of the estimated coefficients found in a panel framework, 
we can confirm that the impact of Japanese trade on the exports from a third-country to 
the US differs among the third countries, and, therefore, that we must allow for 
heterogeneous coefficients for our model specification as in equation (2).  
 
5-3. Country Characteristics as Explanatory Variables 
As is often found in the gravity model literature, we include macroeconomic 
variables in addition to the JPNTHD and JPNUS variables.  They are inflation rates, 
exchange rate volatility, real GDP per capita, nominal GDP, and aggregate trade flows. 
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The list of the macroeconomic variables and their definitions are provided in Appendix 
1.  After dropping some of the macroeconomic variables to avoid multicollinearity, we 
now have 10 macro variables in the matrix tiZ ,  in equation (1).
12 
The estimation results are shown in Table 6.  Unlike past findings in the 
literature, most of the macroeconomic variables turn out to be insignificant, and the 
estimated coefficients for JPNTHD and JPNUS do not change considerably compared to 
the previous estimates, suggesting that inclusion of the macroeconomic variables does 
not improve the estimation.  This is also observed from a little improvement in the 
adjusted R-squared.  We suspect that the insignificance of the macroeconomic 
variables in this estimation is because some of the macroeconomic variables take a 
small number of different values, while export-related data can vary depending on the 
third country (i) and the commodity (j).  For example, there are only 10 different 
values for the nominal income of the US (NY_US) in a sample of 27,930 
observations.13  As such, we need to employ some other data that entail more variation. 
 When estimating equation (2), we did not obtain negative coefficients for 
JPNUS, which would have been consistent with the theoretical prediction of 
head-to-head competition or a production shift.  We then presumed that underlying 
factors such as US market growth might be causing the two variables, THDUS and 
JPNUS, to increase simultaneously.  Inclusion of US nominal income, however, does 
not seem to mitigate this problem, either.  Obviously, US nominal income enters as an 
appropriate explanatory variable for the aggregate imports to the US, but it is not fine 
enough to capture the difference among the commodities when imports are 
disaggregated at the HS 4-digit level.  Therefore, we also need to construct a variable 
which more accurately captures the market size of each commodity in the US and which 
involves more variation. 
 
6. The Empirical Results with More Disaggregated Explanatory Variables 
 In this section, instead of the macroeconomic variables, we include other 
control variables which are more disaggregated than the macroeconomic variables.  
We include US total imports disaggregated at the HS 4-digit level to control for changes 
in the US demand for each commodity.  Also, we include Japanese FDI at the HS 
                                                  
12 These variables are EXVOL_US, INF_THD, INF_US, NY_THD, NY_US, NY_JPN, 
W_IMP_THD, W_IMP_JPN, W_EXP_THD, and W_EXP_US. 
13 The explanatory power of macroeconomic variables in past bilateral trade studies hinges on the use of 
aggregated trade data.   
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2-digit level on each commodity to capture an effect of a production shift by Japanese 
multinational corporations.  
 
6-1. Data Construction 
 As the income level of a country can be an appropriate explanatory variable in 
a conventional bilateral trade model with aggregate data, we expect income allocated 
for a particular commodity to be an explanatory variable for our model with 
disaggregated trade data.  From this perspective, we choose an actual expenditure 
allocated for each imported commodity, i.e., total import for each HS 4-digit commodity, 
as a proxy variable, hoping that this variable will circumvent the simultaneity problem 
for the JPNUS variable.  Using the same data set from International Trade by 
Commodity Statistics, Harmonized System Rev.1, OECD, we construct a variable for the 
US total import from the world for each commodity category disaggregated at the HS 
4-digit level which is expected to represent each commodity market’s size, and we call 
this variable USMAR.14  Unlike the macroeconomic variables, this variable takes as 
many different values as the dependent variable for each individual country. 
 Because FDI involves vertical trade between parent multinationals and their 
subsidiaries overseas, Japanese exports to a third-country should expand when Japanese 
FDI to the third-country increases (see Figure1 (b)).  This downstream FDI may also 
create new exports from the third country to US markets.  In the previous estimation, 
the variable for Japanese exports to a third country may have captured the effect of 
Japanese FDI flows to the third-country.  In this section, we include in our estimation 
equation a variable that specifically refers to Japanese FDI to third countries, so that the 
dynamics of FDI and trade will be separated. 
 The Overseas Japanese Companies Data (OJCD), Toyo Keizai, contains the 
information for approximately 19,000 Japanese overseas subsidiaries.  The data 
contained in this dataset are categorized in 68 industry classifications, which do not 
correspond to HS industry classifications, and include the firms’ established year, 
locations, business objectives, industry classifications, and other information relevant to 
affiliated firms.  Among the 68 industries, we exclude those industries which do not 
actively engage in goods trade such as real estate and banking sectors.  Then, we 
reallocate OJCD’s codes to corresponding HS 2-digit codes and reclassify the data such 
that we can create the FDI data based on the HS classification.15  Thanks to this 
                                                  
14 Like other trade-related variables, we include USMAR as the first differenced variable. 
15 The concordance table is shown in Appendix 2.  When a particular OJCD code covers more than two 
HS 2-digit codes, the FDI data for this OJCD code is counted in all corresponding HS 2-digit codes.   
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concordance effort, we can construct a variable that refers to Japanese FDI stock to 
Asian third countries in terms of the number of established subsidiaries by Japanese 
firms for each host country, year, and HS 2-digit industry code.16 
 
6-2. Estimation Results 
 With the two additional variables, our estimation model now becomes: 
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 The estimation results are shown in Table 7.  While most of the coefficients 
for the US market size variables, USMAR, are significantly positive, the coefficient for 
the Japanese FDI variable is significantly positive only for China.  The positive 
coefficient should mean that the FDI by Japanese multinationals to a third country and 
the exports from the third country to the US have a complementary relationship.  
Interestingly, when we control for the Japanese FDI, the estimated coefficient for the 
Japanese exports to China is no longer significant.  Previously, we interpreted the 
results in Table 5 that Japanese exports to China are promoting Chinese exports to the 
US.  However, in the estimation based on equation (3), this relationship disappears.  
With the results from these two estimations, we can surmise that Chinese exports to the 
US grow only through a shift of Japanese production plants to China, but not from 
indirect technology transfer through Japanese exports. (See section 3-3.) 
 The triangular trade relationship involving Korea and Indonesia casts an 
interesting contrast to the case with China.  The coefficients of the Japanese exports 
variables to these two countries remain significant at the five percent significance level 
while the coefficients of the FDI variables are not significant.  For Korea and 
Indonesia, we can infer that Japanese exports to these countries have some enhancement 
effect on their exports to the US while Japanese FDI does not have any significant 
impact on these countries’ exports to the US.  The persistence of the positive 
coefficient for the Japanese exports to Korea and Indonesia can be attributed to 
                                                  
16 Therefore, two different HS 4-digit codes with the same first two digits share the same number of 
accumulated Japanese affiliated firms.  This may not be problematic as long as there is cross-industry 
effect within the HS 2-digit level since we are trying to capture the trade-creating effect of FDI. 
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technological-transfer through Japanese products or competitive effect of substitutes 
imported to these countries.   
In contrast to the previous results shown in Table 5, the coefficients for JPNUS 
are also significantly negative for Indonesia and the Philippines in addition to China.  
Moreover, the puzzling estimation result for Korea, i.e., a significantly positive 
coefficient for JPNUS, is no longer observed.  We believe including the USMAR 
variable, a proxy for the expenditure level in each commodity market, eliminates the 
positive income effect of US market growth previously captured by the JPNUS variable.  
It is noteworthy that the absolute value of the coefficient of JPNUS for China is 
relatively larger than that of Indonesia or the Philippines.  Therefore, we can conclude 
that the degree of competition between Chinese exports and Japanese exports is 
relatively high.17 18  
 
7. Conclusions 
 Among 8 countries investigated in our study, we have found some evidence 
that the exports of China and those of Japan are directly competing in US markets while 
the exports of China to the US is partly promoted by Japanese exports to China. 
However, after controlling for FDI, trade enhancing effect of Japanese export to China 
disappears.  With statistically significant coefficient of FDI for China, we can conclude 
that Japanese exports to China seem to promote Chinese exports to US because of 
increasing vertical trades between Japanese multinationals and their corresponding 
affiliates. The combined evidence of the substitute relationship between Chinese and 
Japanese exports and export-promoting effect of Japanese FDI in China confirms a view 
that China competes vigorously with Japan in US markets while Japanese 
multinationals are shifting production bases to China in forming a global 
production-exporting network. 
 We also obtained the result for other Asian countries that their exports are 
competing with Japanese exports in the US.  These countries are Indonesia and 
Philippine.  However, the absolute magnitude of the coefficients remained much 
higher for China.  This just confirms that Chinese exports are in more competition with 
Japan. 
                                                  
17 In a preliminary analysis, this could also be attributed to the shift of production from Japan to China 
due to the Japanese FDI.  With inclusion of FDI variable, this effect is supposedly removed from JPNUS 
variable. 
18 We also investigate equation (3) with the macroeconomic variables.  The results remain qualitatively 
quite similar.  The coefficient of FDI for China becomes statistically insignificant; however, its p-value 
is 14.8%.  The estimation result can be obtained from the corresponding author upon request. 
 21
 From the political perspective view, our findings shed a light on different 
aspect of current debate about the trade dispute between China and US.  Our empirical 
result indicates an increase in Chinese exports might be a reflection of Japanese 
multinationals’ operation in China.  Of course, for industries in which Chinese exports 
are under allegations, these products may not be strongly related to Japanese 
multinational operations. With the high growth currently observed in China, however, it 
is not difficult to imagine a case in which Chinese exports brought to WTO trade 
dispute settlement are actually products of Japanese multinationals. 
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Appendix 1:  
exvol_US = exchange volatility between THD’s currency and the U.S. dollars 
exvol_JPN = exchange volatility between THD’s currency and Japanese yen 
inf_THD = THD’s inflation rate  
inf_US = US inflation rate 
inf_JPN = Japanese inflation rate 
rypc_THD = real GDP per capita of THD 
rypc_US = real GDP per capita of US 
rypc_JPN = real GDP per capita of Japan 
ny_THD = nominal GDP of THD 
ny_US = nominal GDP of US 
ny_JPN == nominal GDP of Japan 
W_IMP_THD = THD’s imports from the world 
W_IMP_US = US imports from the world 
W_IMP_JPN = Japanese imports from the world 
W_EXP_THD = THD’s exports to the world 
W_EXP_US = US exports to the world 
W_EXP_JPN = Japanese exports to the world 
 
Appendix2: Concordance Table for FDI and Trade Classification 
 
HS Code Toyo Keizai Code     HS Code Toyo Keizai Code    
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th    1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
1       53  700 2700   
3  200 600 2600   54  700 2700   
5  200 600 2600   55  700 2700   
6  200 2600    56  700 2700   
7  200 600 2600   57  700 2700   
9  200 600 2600   58  700 2700   
10  200 600 2600   59  700 2700   
11  200 600 2600   60  700 2700   
12  200 600 2600   61  700 2700   
13  200 600 2600   62  700 2700   
14  200 600 2600   63  700 2700   
15  200 600 2600   64      
16  600     65      
17  600     66      
18  600     67      
19  600     68  1400 3200   
20  600     69  1400 3200   
21  600     70  1400 3200   
22  600     71      
23  600     72  1500 3300   
24       73  1500 3300   
25  300     74  1600 1700 3400 3500 
26  300     75  1600 1700 3400 3500 
27  300 1200 3000   76  1600 1700 3400 3500 
28  1100 2900    78  1600 1700 3400 3500 
29  1100 2900    79  1600 1700 3400 3500 
30  1100 2900    80  1600 1700 3400 3500 
31  1100 2900    81  1600 1700 3400 3500 
32  1100 2900    82  1600 1700 3400 3500 
33  1100 2900    83  1600 1700 3400 3500 
34  1100 2900    84  1800 3600   
35  1100 2900    85  1900 3700   
36  1100 2900    86  2000 3800   
37  1100 2900    87  2100 3900   
38  1100 2900    88  2000 3800   
39  1100 2900    89  2000 3800   
40  1300 3100    90  2200 4000   
41  1300 3100    91  2200 4000   
42  1300 3100    92  2300    
44  800 2800    93      
46  800 2800    94      
48  900 2800    95      
49  1000     96      
50  700 2700    97      
51  700 2700 
52  700 2700 
Table 1: Trade of China with Major Trading Parters 
                                                    (thousand dallars) 
 Imports  
     1992              1995               1998               2000  
 1 Hong Kong  20,533,589    Japan     29,004,529      Japan     28,275,074      Japan     41,509,675  
 2 Japan    13,682,461    United States  16,118,291      United States  16,883,171      Taiwan     25,493,561  
 3 United States  8,900,735    Taiwan     14,783,944      Taiwan     16,631,051      Korea     23,207,406  
 4 Taiwan     5,865,971    Korea     10,293,234      Korea     15,014,348      United States  22,363,148  
 5 Germany    4,015,042    Hong Kong    8,590,713      Germany     7,020,657      Germany    10,408,731  
   
  World    80,585,333     World    132,083,539      World    140,236,807      World    225,093,731  
                                                            
                                                            
 Exports                                                         
     1992              1995               1998               2000  
 1 Hong Kong  37,512,229     Hong Kong   35,983,427      Hong Kong   38,741,792      United States  52,099,220  
 2 Japan    11,678,713     Japan     28,466,685      United States  37,947,666      Hong Kong   44,518,285  
 3 United States  8,593,800     United States  24,713,498      Japan     29,660,114      Japan     41,654,314  
 4 Germany    2,447,990     Korea      6,687,805      Germany     7,354,309      Korea     11,292,364  
 5 Korea     2,404,912     Germany     5,671,451      Korea      6,251,516      Germany     9,277,790  
   
  World    84,940,062     World    148,779,565      World    183,809,065      World    249,202,551  
Source: ITCS,OECD 
Table 2:  Share of Trade by Japan and US among the Asian countries 
 
Exporting Country 
  1990   1995   2000  
  Japan US   Japan US   Japan US  
 
China  0.15  0.08   0.19  0.17   0.17  0.21  
Korea  0.19  0.29   0.13  0.19   0.12  0.22  
Hong Kong 0.06  0.24   0.06  0.22   0.06  0.23  
Singapore 0.09  0.21   0.08  0.18   0.08  0.17  
Thailand  0.17  0.23   0.17  0.18   0.15  0.21  
Indonesia  0.43  0.13   0.27  0.14   0.23  0.14  
Philippine 0.20  0.38   0.16  0.36   0.15  0.30  
Malaysia  0.15  0.17   0.12  0.21   0.13  0.21  
 
 
 
Importing Country 
  1990   1995   2000  
  Japan US   Japan US   Japan US  
 
China  0.14  0.12   0.22  0.12   0.18  0.10  
Korea  0.25  0.23   0.24  0.23   0.20  0.18  
Hong Kong 0.16  0.08   0.15  0.08   0.12  0.07  
Singapore 0.20  0.16   0.21  0.15   0.17  0.15  
Thailand  0.30  0.11   0.29  0.12   0.25  0.12  
Indonesia  0.25  0.11   0.23  0.12   0.16  0.10  
Philippine 0.18  0.20   0.22  0.18   0.19  0.17  
Malaysia  0.24  0.17   0.27  0.16   0.21  0.17  
 
Source: Direcion of Trade, IMF       
        
Table3 : Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in the Asia (1989 - 2002) 
(100M Yen)                
(Cases)  1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002  
China   587  511  787 1,381 1,954 2,683 4,319 2,828 2,438 1,377  849 1,112 1,808 2,152 
   (126) (165) (246) (490) (700) (636) (770) (365) (258) (114)  (78) (105) (189) (263) 
Korea   799  419  357  291  289  420  433  468  543  389 1,094  899  704  763 
    (81)  (54)  (48)  (28)  (34)  (27)  (25)  (33)  (53)  (48)  (62)  (52)  (47)  (44) 
Hong Kong 2,502 2,610 1,260  966 1,447 1,179 1,106 1,675  860  789 1,088 1,039  374  248 
   (335) (244) (178) (154) (184) (112) (119)  (89) (121)  (51)  (76)  (52)  (37)  (31) 
Singapore 2,573 1,232  837  875  735 1,101 1,143 1,256 2,238  832 1,102  505 1,433  915 
   (181) (139) (103) (100)  (97)  (69)  (94) (102)  (96)  (58)  (51)  (25)  (31)  (34) 
Thailand 1,703 1,696 1,107  849  680  749 1,196 1,581 2,291 1,760  924 1,030 1,105  614 
   (403) (377) (258) (130) (127) (126) (147) (196) (154)  (72)  (72)  (62)  (51)  (52) 
Indonesia  840 1,615 1,628 2,142  952 1,808 1,548 2,720 3,085 1,398 1,024  464  622  509 
   (140) (155) (148) (122) (115) (116) (168) (160) (170)  (64)  (57)  (26)  (56)  (41)  
Philippine  269  383  277  210  236  683  692  630  642  488  689  514  951  500  
    (87)  (58)  (42)  (45)  (56)  (75) (100)  (75)  (64)  (46)  (32)  (44)  (25)  (20)  
Malaysia  902 1,067 1,202  919  892  772  555  644  971  668  588  256  320   98  
   (159) (169) (136) (111)  (92)  (51)  (57)  (69)  (82)  (34)  (44)  (23)  (18)  (11)  
 
World  90,339 83,527 56,862 44,313 41,514 42,808 49,568 54,095 66,236 52,413 74,703 53,854 39,922 44,175  
   (6589) (5863) (4564) (3741) (3488) (2478) (2863) (2501) (2495) (1616) (1729) (1701) (1768) (2144)  
Source: Outward Direct Investment, Ministry of Finance, Japan. 
Table 5: Within Estimators for Triangular Trade Equation 
       
Variable  Coefficient  Variable  Coefficient 
JPNCHN   0.125**   JPNUS(CHN) -0.048*   
  (0.063)     (0.028) 
JPNKOR   0.301**   JPNUS(KOR)  0.215*** 
  (0.122)     (0.069) 
JPNHKG   0.071     JPNUS(HKG)  0.022    
  (0.068)     (0.016) 
JPNSGP   0.319     JPNUS(SGP)  0.082    
  (0.246)     (0.098) 
JPNTHA   0.006     JPNUS(THA)  0.024    
  (0.035)     (0.015) 
JPNIDN   0.024     JPNUS(IDN) -0.004    
  (0.017)     (0.006) 
JPNPHL   0.161     JPNUS(PHL) -0.024    
  (0.369)     (0.023) 
JPNMAL   0.732***  JPNUS(MAL)  0.053    
  (0.245)     (0.040) 
 
NOB=  27930 Adj. R2 = 0.350 
 
Note: White heteroskedasticity consistent standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  The number of commodities for each country differs due to selection 
criteria; 576 for China, 572 for Korea, 487 for Hong Kong, 288 for Singapore, 310 for Thailand, 162 for Indonesia, 
180 for Philippine, and 218 for Malaysia.       
Table 6: Within Estimators for Triangular Trade Equation with Macro Variables 
 
Variable  Coefficient  Variable  Coefficient  Variable  Coefficient 
JPNCHN   0.109*    JPNUS(CHN) -0.049*    EXVOL_US -6,347   
  (0.063)     (0.028)     (9,781) 
JPNKOR   0.299**   JPNUS(KOR)  0.215***  INF_THD -0.631    
  (0.124)     (0.069)       (52) 
JPNHKG   0.074     JPNUS(HKG)  0.023     INF_US    457    
  (0.069)     (0.016)     (1,118) 
JPNSGP   0.319     JPNUS(SGP)  0.082     NY_THD -0.016    
  (0.246)     (0.098)     (0.012) 
JPNTHA   0.018     JPNUS(THA)  0.024     NY_US   0.007    
  (0.036)     (0.015)     (0.005) 
JPNIDN   0.031*    JPNUS(IDN)  -0.003     NY_JPN  -0.002    
  (0.018)     (0.006)     (0.002) 
JPNPHL   0.171     JPNUS(PHL) -0.022     W_IMP_THD 0.069**  
  (0.367)     (0.022)     (0.032) 
JPNMAL   0.733***  JPNUS(MAL) 0.052      W_IMP_JPN -0.055    
  (0.245)     (0.040)     (0.044) 
          W_EXP_THD  0.251*** 
            (0.061) 
          W_EXP_US -0.011    
          (0.030) 
NOB = 27930 Adj. R2 = 0.351   
 
Note: White heteroskedasticity consistent standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, 
respectively.  The number of commodities for each country differs due to selection criteria; 576 for China, 572 for Korea, 487 for Hong Kong, 288 for 
Singapore, 310 for Thailand, 162 for Indonesia, 180 for Philippine, and 218 for Malaysia.  
Table 7: Within Estimators for Triangular Trade Equation with FDI and US Market Size 
                
Variable  Coefficient Variable  Coefficient Variable  Coefficient Variable  Coefficient 
JPNCHN   0.038    JPNUS(CHN) -0.141*** FDICHN  51.358*** USMAR(CHN) 0.052*** 
  (0.067)    (0.044)    (15)    (0.016) 
JPNKOR   0.202**  JPNUS(KOR)  0.055    FDIKOR  -531.120    USMAR(KOR) 0.093*** 
  (0.095)    (0.050)    (522)    (0.024) 
JPNHKG   0.048    JPNUS(HKG)  0.012    FDIHKG  -42.172    USMAR(HKG) 0.006    
  (0.069)    (0.012)    (54)    (0.004) 
JPNSGP   0.263    JPNUS(SGP)  0.063    FDISGP  -107.803    USMAR(SGP) 0.017    
  (0.224)    (0.110)    (231)    (0.016) 
JPNTHA  -0.002    JPNUS(THA)  0.013    FDITHA  -27.908    USMAR(THA) 0.006    
  (0.031)    (0.019)    (23)    (0.005) 
JPNIDN   0.026**  JPNUS(IDN) -0.020*** FDIIDN  -76.020   USMAR(IDN) 0.008*** 
  (0.011)    (0.008)    (72)    (0.003) 
JPNPHL  -0.003    JPNUS(PHL) -0.083*** FDIPHL  90.768    USMAR(PHL) 0.031**  
  (0.345)    (0.032)    (175)    (0.013) 
JPNMAL   0.440**  JPNUS(MAL) -0.041    FDIMAL  -647.534*** USMAR(MAL) 0.068*** 
  (0.224)    (0.042)    (212)    (0.022) 
 
  NOB = 27930 Adj.R2 =  0.445          
 
Note: White heteroskedasticity consistent standard deviations are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
The number of commodities for each country differs due to selection criteria; 576 for China, 572 for Korea, 487 for Hong Kong, 288 for Singapore, 310 for 
Thailand, 162 for Indonesia, 180 for Philippine, and 218 for Malaysia.         
